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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
Bt;ILD, INC., a Utah <__•orporation, ) 
Plain tiff and Responde u t, 
-vs.-
.JOTIX G. ITALASANO and THEO 
IT.AL.A~AN<), his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
No.10093 
ST~\TE~IE~1, OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This i~ an action for a suin claimed to be due and 
o\ring to thP plaintiff corporation for constructing a 
hon1e for the defendants in Bountiful, Utah, and the de-
fendants counterclailned alleging that they were damaged 
by plaintiff~ failure to perform according to the terms 
of a contract bet,veen the parties. 
DISPOSITION I:t\ LOvVER __ COURT 
The ra~t> \\·a~ tried to the court. Fro1n a judgn1ent 
in favor of plaintiff in the an1ount of $3,483.44 together 
\rith eo~ts, and no cause of action on the counterclai1n, 
defendants appeal. 
1 
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RELIEF s.o~UGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal of the judgment and judg-
Inent in their favor, or that failing, a re-examination 
of the case in equity and a balancing of the equities be-
tween the parties 
STATEME.NT O·F FACTS 
Plaintiff corporation, essentially a one-1nan corpora-
tion owned and controlled by one Richard J. Stromness, 
a man with sixteen years' building experience (T. 3), 
constructed a home for the defendants on their own lot 
and foundation at 6393 South 4th East in Bountiful, Utah. 
Work commenced in about June of 1959 and was com-
pleted about March of 19'60. It is the contention of plain-
tiff that there was a contract between the parties to build 
the home and that it was of the "cost-plus" type, i.e., the 
builder figures all his costs of building, then to this 
figure he adds a percentage for overhead and an addi-
tional percentage for profit. (T. 37). 
Defendants on the other hand maintain that the con-
tract to build the home was for a sum not to exceed $15,-
000.00 in any event ( T. 125). 
The agreen1ent and arrangements between the parties 
to build the ho1ne were oral, and it is clear that plaintiff 
neglected to enter into a written contract when de-
fendants inquired of him about it, and in fact didn't desire 
one (T. 160). 
2 
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TJu~ learned Trial {~ourt coneluded that to pffect sub-
stantial justieP bet\Vl'Pn the parties hE' would 1nake a 
eontruct bPt\reen the1n in equity (R. 29). In doing so 
thP <·ourt took th-.~ total a1nount for tnaterials and labor 
as contained in plaintiff's accounting and deducted the 
runount~ paid directly to suppliers by defendants and all 
cash paytnents to plaintiff. This left the balance of 
$3483.44 for which the court rendered judgment in favor 
ofthP plaintiff (R. 29 and30). 
In tnaking this contract between the parties, the 
('Ourt took into account only the disbursements of the 
plaintiff and didn't consider the additional disburse-
Hlt1nts of the defendants on the home, and the appraisal 
"rhi('h \vas n1ade at about the time of occupancy (R. 28-30). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE EVIDENCE D·OES NOT SUPPORT A FIND-
ING THAT THERE WAS NO CQN·TRACT BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES TO CONSTRU,CT A HOME FOR DEFENDANTS 
FOR THE SUM OF $15,000.00 OR LESS, AND IT WAS ERROR 
FOR THE COURT TO WRITE A CONTRAiCT F'OF THE 
PARTIES. 
rrhe difficulty of the parties here stems mainly from 
their lack of a written contract 'vhich plaintiff delcined 
to entPr into before 'vork began (T.160). 
Plaintiff contends that the contract to build the 
honte v;a~ of the ~'cost-plus" type, i.e., materials and labor 
plus a 1narkup for overhead and profit (T. 37) while de-
3 
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fendants contend that the agreen1ent 'vas to the effect 
that the cost vlas not to exceed $15,000.00 and "yas to be 
less, depending upon how much work ~Ir. Italasano and 
his family could do ( T. 125). 
We now examine the transcript to see which of these 
two positions is sustained by the weight of the evidence. 
John G. Italasano testified that from the beginning 
of his discussion with Richard Stromness, president of 
plaintiff corporation, he emphasized that he had only 
$15,000.00-and his testimony is that Mr. Stromness 
(after studying the plans and specifications to the home 
for two months) said that the home could be built for 
$15,000.00 ( T. 121). 
It is true that defendant agreed to work himself, 
but this was to effect savings below the $15,000.00 figure 
('T. 122). It is also clear that Stromness knew that $15,-
000.00 was all that was available for the work since he 
talked with defendant's employer who loaned defendants 
the money to build the home (T. 122). The agreement was 
clearly to the effect that the total expenditures by the de-
fendant were not to exceed $15,000.00, and any saving 
below that figure was to inure to the defendants. (T.125) 
Plaintiff testified that in cost-plus work, a careful 
record of the work done is kept and a periodic accounting 
given to the owner (T. 5). Here no accounting was given 
to the owner till after the home 'vas completed (T. 73), 
although plaitiff told defendant when the job was two-
thirds complete that he was within the $15,000.00 figure 
( T. 29'). 
4 
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Plaintiff's expert on consrtuction contracts, ~{r. 
Royal Atwood, didn't testify that this type of contract 
i~ customary for residential construction (T. 45), and 
had never heard of an entire building being constructed 
with this type of contract er. 46). Cost-plus contracts 
are usually only for a part of the whole job or to finish 
work already provided for in a main contract (T·. 48). 
Defendants' witness, rrerrell F. Beddingfield, a con-
struction foren1an for Skyline Construction 'Co., but 
forn1erly with Build, Inc., the plaintiff, testified that in 
the construction business, on cost-plus contracts, very 
few 1naterials are shuttled from one job to another since 
the bookkeeping then becomes very burdensome. 
The following question was asked the witness: 
Q. Is there a custom in the building and con-
struction industry about shuttling materials 
back and forth from project to project, on 
these two different types of contracts (i.e. 
cost-plus and.fixed amount) (T'.l17) ~ 
.. A .. fter n1uch objection and strenuous efforts on the 
part of plaintiff's counsel to keep this evidence out of the 
record, the \Vitness was allowed to answer: 
A. To the best of 1uy knowledge, on cost-plus 
work, material is 1noved as little as possible, 
because of the bookkeeping involved to move 
it. On jobs that I personally have run, and 
been in a supervisory capacity over, every 
item has to be accounted for. And this was 
the reason it is not done in a cost-plus, any 
n1ore than an absolute minimum (T. 118). 
5 
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But materials \Vere moved from one job site to an-
other during the construction of the I talasano hotne 
(T. 98, 197 and 198). The witness Bedingfield, \vho had 
worked on the Italasano home, testified in response to a 
question asking if he had seen an exchange of materials 
between the Italasano project and St. Olaf's project: 
A. Oh, there was sheeting rnoved fron1 the Itala-
sano home to the St. Olaf's, and vice versa. 
Trim from St. Olaf's. And I believe there 
was a door moved from St. Olaf's to the 
Italasano home. 
Q. Who authorized this 1 
A. Mr. Stromness (T. 98) 
Now here on plaintff's accounting (Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit A) do we see these items mentioned. This hardly 
shows a cost-plus contract-on the contrary, this evidence 
strongly supports a fixed-sum type of contract. There is 
more. The witness Beddingfield while examining the 
plans and specifications for the Italasano hotne quotes 
Mr. Stromness as saying that he had an offer to build 
this home for $15,000.00. He then mentioned that l\ir. 
Stromness discussed with him how to figure the cost of 
3onstruction ( T. 95). 
When the accounting in excess of $5,000.00 over the 
agreed upon price was finally prepared, Stromness went 
to his men and asked them to return this money for their 
labor on the home. Beddingfield testified that he and 
others \vho \vere present were informed that ". . . the 
G 
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labor costs had, in ~Ir. Strontness' opinion, exceeded the 
agreed upon price, I assu1ned to be $15,000.00, and he 
felt that it was strictly labor ... ''. (T. 97). It appears 
that when the plaintiff decided he hadn't come out on his 
bargain, h(• tried first to get sotne of his money back 
fro1n his Inen. When he was unsuccessful in this, he 
tnrned to the defendants. It is very significant, however, 
that he did not file a mechanic's lien. Mr. Stron1ness is a 
licensed contractor; he is fan1i.liar with mechanic's liens 
nnd their significance, but nevertheless, .he di~'t file one 
( T. ~7). Why· didn't lie if his contract was cost-plus~ It 
\Votdd appear that he would certainly file a lien if it were 
propPr 'for hitn to do so. He is also aware that it is a 
tnisdetneanor to falsely file a lien (see 38-1-25, Utah Code 
A.nnotat'ed, 1953). · The failure of a licensed builder of 
eonsiderable experience ·to file a lien doesn't show that 
the contract here was cost~plus, rather it shows that there 
' I 
was a fixed-sutn type of contract wherein plaintiff would 
have had no recourse to the lien statutes. 
The evidence clearly points to-- a contract for $15,-
000.00 or less. This is all the funds· at defendants' dis-
posal and the plaintiff was aware of this ('T. 56 and 122). 
Defendant's testimony is to the effect that this was their 
agreement (T .. 125). ·Plaintiff's .contention that he was 
to ~UP!Jly only technical and skilled serVices and that de-
fendant~ \Vould do the actual work (T. 10) is not sup-
ported by the evidence. Among the first men sent to the 
Italasano job when work commenced was an apprentice 
carpenter (T. 94-96). Does this lend support to his 
t~stimony of supplying only skilled and technical assist-
ance t ''T e submit that it does not; ·on the contrary this 
7 
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supports the contention of the defendants that there 
was a fixed-sum agreement here. Furthermore plain-
tiff admitted that he authorized his men to 'vork long 
hours in other than technical and skilled capacities from 
the beginning (T. 76). This hardly substantiates his 
contention that he had a cost-plus contract with the de-
fendants. 
In view of the evidence which clearly shows a con-
tract for the construction of the home for $15,000.00 it 
was improper for the Trial Court to find "That it \Va~ 
the understanding of the plaintiff that the plaintiff would 
furnish his organization, *** and would hold the con-
struction costs as nearly as possible to $15,000.00 but 
that the plaintiff would be paid an amount equal to the 
costs expended by him plus ten percent for supervision." 
and that "It was the understanding of the defendants on 
the other hand that with the labor and material furnished 
by them the maximum cost to them \vas not to exceed 
$15,000.00'' and it was error to award a judgment for 
$3483.44 to the plaintiff by "makiug a contract between 
the parties" (R. 29). Certainly the parties didn't embark 
upon a project so great as constructing a house without 
a contract! It is clear that the duty of the court is to 
interpret that contract, not rewrite or make one for the 
parties simply because the court feels it is necessary 
to rewrite the contract to effect justice between the par· 
ties. Competent parties are entilted to make their own 
lawful contracts or contractual arrangements, and it is 
not within the province or power of the court to alter, 
revise, modify or rewrite a contract by construction or 
to make a new or different contract for the parties be-
8 
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eaust' Uu~ court ft·t~l:::; that justice would be served therP-
by. rrhe duty of the court is confined to the interpreta-
tion and enfore<•BlPnt of the one which they have made 
for themselvPH. In this connection see the opinion of 
this court in East jfill Creek Water Co. v. Salt Lake 
City. 108 Utah :315, 159 P. 2d 863 (1945). The rule is 
further :::;tated at 17 1\ c.,J .S. Contracts, Sec. 296 ( 3), 
pages 96 and 97 as follows: 
The eourt 1nay not rewrite thP contract 
for the purpose of accomplishing that which, 
in its opinion, 1nay appear proper, or, on gen-
eral principles of abstract justice, or under the 
rulP of liberal construction, 1nake for the par-
tit·~ a contract which they did not make for 
themselves, or 1nake for them a better contract 
than they chose, or saw fit, to make for them-
selves, or remake a contract, under the guise 
of construction, because it later appears that a 
different agreement should have been consuln-
tnated in the first instance, or in order to meet 
special circumstances or contingencies against 
which the parties have not protected them-
selves. (Emphasis added.) 
Thi~ court has ruled in the case of Carlson vs. Ham-
ilton. S Utah 2d 272, 332 P. 2d 989 ( 1958) that the court 
may not rewrite contracts for the parties thereto, and 
that the parties are entitled to enter into any contract 
on their O\Vn terms-even if the resulting contract is 
unrea~onable or may lead to hardship on one side. See 
al~o the rasP of Cole vs. Pa'rker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P. 
~d 623 (1956) "~herein this court stated: "'ThP courts 
cannot :-;upervise decisions Inade in the business "\Vorld 
anrl grant relief \vhen the bargain proves improvident." 
9 
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It is also clear that a court of equity may not re-
write the contract for the parties. The rule is set out 
at 30 C. J. S., Equity, Sec. 63, page 411 as follows: 
A court of equity cannot *CI"::II= :JI: make a contract 
for the parties, 'nor vary the ~erms of the one 
made, nor substitute another one therefor, nor 
can it remedy a wrong by making in effect a 
contract between the parties witp reference to 
the subject matter. 
POINT II. 
THA'T EVEN IF T·HIS COURT CON·CLUDE~S THAT THE 
FI:t{DINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT 'T•O THE EFFECT THAT 
THERE WAS N·O ACT'UAL CONTRACT BETWEEN THE 
P ART'IES WAS PROPER, T'HE RULING O:f THE TRIAL 
COURT AND THE GRAN'TING OF THE JUDGMENT FOR 
$3,483.44 IS IMPROPER UNDER 'T·HE RULES OF EQUITY. 
This court must review the evidence as ·well as the 
law on the appeal of a case in equity from the District 
Court. See Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Sec 9. 
Therefore this appeal on the record from the District -t~IS. 
Court to tilowR: court amounts virtually to a trial de 
novo. This position was clearly. enunciated in Jensen 
vs. Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 P. 1034 (1929). in the follow-
ing language : 
This case is one in equity. In this jurisdiction 
the binding effect of findings of the trial court 
in law cases is different fron1 that in equity cases. 
In the former, the findings, as a general rule, 
are approved if there is sufficient competent Pvi-
dence to support them, and ordinarily, are not 
disturbed, unless it is Inanifest that they are so 
10 
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ch·arly against the weight of the evidence as to 
indicate a n1isconception, or not a due considera-
tion of it. In the latter, our duty and respon~i­
bility in approving or disapproving findings when 
challenged are n1ore comprehensive. In such 
case, on an appeal and a review on questions of 
both law and fact, the review in effect is a trial 
dr novo on the record. (emphasis added) 
Abo in the case of Dahlberg vs. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 
:!H:! P. ~14 (1930) this court said at page 164, "(this 
ease) being an action in equity, the parties, under our 
Con~titution are entitled to our judgment, as well as 
that of the Trial Court." See also the following cases 
w·herein this Court has held that its review of a case 
in equity is a trial de novo 
Federal Land Bank of Berkeley vs. Salt Lake 
l/' alley Sand & Gravel Co., et al, 96 Utah 359, 85 
P. 2d 791 (1939-) 
Sipherd vs. Sipherd, 83 Utah 245, 27 p·. 2d 801 
(1933) 
Wallick vs. Vance, 76 Utah 209,289 P.103 (1930) 
Here the record as we have heretofore reviewed it 
clearly sho\vs that Richard Stromness, president of 
plaintiff corporation who acted for it during the entire 
course of events which led to the difficulties of the 
parties herein, and a man with sixteen years' building 
Pxperience, 'vas certainly in a position to avert any loss 
or in effect head off any difficulties with over spending 
on this ho1ne. It was his responsibility to keep 
the books and records of the work and expenditures. 
By his own testimony it was his duty to give periodic, 
accurate and detailed accountings to the defendants. 
11 
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This he failed to do even though he knew that the 
defendants only had $15,000.00 to finance the building 
of this hon1e (T.7). The record is also certain that he 
didn't properly supervise and control his Inen and their 
work and yet they continued to work and charge large 
amounts of labor against the hoine-son1eti1nes even 
some on Sundays or holidays, and even during a period 
of at least one month when Stromness was out of town. 
{T. 79). 
There was no supervisor present on the job to direct 
the work of the men (T. 96), and plaintiff didn't file 
Inechanic's liens ( T. 87), but he did try and get some 
of the money back that he had paid his men who had 
worked without supervision (T. 97). Certainly it was 
Mr. Stromness' duty to supervise his men and keep labor 
costs in line-they were not working for Mr. Italasano 
( T. 97). If there has been injury here, plaintiff is the 
party who was in the better position to forsee the prob-
lem and to prevent the injury, and if he failed to do so, 
he must bear any loss. As stated at 19 American Juris-
prudence, Equity, Sec. 482, pages 334 and 335: 
If their claims are not shown to be equal, the 
decision should be against the party who has 
the weaker or inferior equity; and this party 
is the one who is sho,vn to have been in the 
better position to avert the loss, injury, or 
prejudice 'vhich now n1ust be borne by the 
other. A determination of the issue is gov-
erned by the proof as to the relative knowledge 
of the parties or their means respectively of 
farseeing the dilemma 'vhich has co1ne into 
existence. (emphasis added) 
12 
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lf the relative positions of the parties in equity are 
Pttual, the partie~ ntust retnain in their respective posi-
tions as is borne out by the following language from the 
:-;rune ~eetion set out immediately above: 
One who institutes suit against another must be 
prepared to sho"T a prior or superior equity in 
hintself. If the equity of the one party is shown 
to be equal to the equity of the other-that is if 
one 'vas as well situated as the other to forsee 
and prevent the prejudicial situation-the loss or 
harm n1ust be borne by the party on whom it has 
fallen. 
Even assutning that both parties are "innocent," i.e. 
ignorant of the harmful consequences of their acts, the 
one connnitting the act or acts which caused the harm 
ntust bear any loss in this connection. S·ee 19 A me ric an 
Jurisprudence, Equity, Sec. 483, page 335, wherein the 
follo,ving maxims are set forth: 
Where one of two innocent parties must suffer, 
he through whose agency the loss occurred must 
bear it . 
. .:\.nd also: 
\Yhere one of two parties, both guiltless of inten-
tional wrong, must suffer a loss, the one on whose 
conduct, act, or omission occasions the loss must 
stand the consequences. 
The district court in writing a contract in equity for 
the parties looked only to the actual disbursement of 
the plaintiff in determining what was equitable. The 
appraisal of the home which was made on Aprilll, 1960 
-almost immediately after occupancy - was not con-
13 
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• 
sidered by the court in arriving at itt; decision although 
the appraisal was admitted into evidence as Defendants' 
Exhibit 4. An examination of the appraisal in its entirety 
reveals that the home in question had an appraised valu-
ation before depreciation of $20,128.00 including the 
garage, but not the lot. 
The defendants' contributions to the value of the 
home should certainly be taken into account in arriving 
at a just and equitable balace of the equities between the 
parties, if the court must write a contract for them. The 
record shows that defendants had already placed the 
footers and foundations which were worth at least $800.00 
and perhaps as much as $1500.00 (T. 210), carpets and 
drapes were $1700.00 ( T. 210), at least 1000 hours of the 
defendant's own work which if figured at an ultracon-
servative $1.75 per hour would be worth $1750.00 (T. 136). 
These items coupled with the fact that $15,800.00 (T. 131) 
was paid out directly shows that the defendants contri-
buted the sum of over $20,000.00 toward a home which is 
valued at slightly over $20,000.00. If the judgment grant-
ed by the trial court in the amount of nearly $3500.00 is 
allowed to stand, this means that defendants will be 
placed in the position of losing at least $3500.00 while 
plaintiff would be held relatively harmless. Wherein 
lies the equity of the Trial Court's decision when such 
a result follows~ If the court felt that the appraisal was 
not accurate, the defendants stood ready to supply any 
appraisal desired (T. 208). 
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Tht· n'cord ~ho\\·s that thP~ .. parties had a contract 
whPrein the plaintiff agrPl'd to construct a horne on the 
tlt·fendant~, lot and foundation for a ~nun not to exceed 
$15,000.00. The court's clear obligation is to enforce that 
<·ontnu·t, and <'Prtainl~· not to rP\\?ritP the contract for 
the partiP:-\. rrhP l'UlP!-1 Of equity do not permit the COUrt 
to rP\rritP a <'ont rart or <·on~true one so that an inequity 
rP~ults. EvPn if this eourt should deterrnine that the 
di~tri<'t court acted vroperly in \vriting a contract for 
thP partiP~ in equity, the value of the horne as indicated 
hy thP apprai:-;al ~hould hP considered by this court in 
arri,·ing at an Pqnitable solution of the parties' problems. 
ThP judg1nent of the Trial'Conrt should be reversed 
nnd judgrnent entered for the defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. MARK JOHNSON 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Appellants 
170 West 4th South 
Bountiful, Utah 
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